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Comments on "�tient Morality" 
David E. White 
Vhat is a good patient? Villi.a Ruddick finds the current 
90del• uaaatiafactory. Each ia baaed, he claims, on an taper­
fect analogy with a non-.edical relationship. After exposing 
the inadequacies of the ·chil d , ·  ·conau1111er.· ·client� and 
•soldier· 11a de l 1 .  luddick proposes the ·coach and athlete• 
.odel and defends it by ·elaborating and testing• it• applica­
tion to two cases. At the end of hia paper, Ruddick acknow­
ledges that hie •-.!taphorica1· methodology is neither conclu­
sive in itself nor de�nstratively superior to other 11ethoda. 
lt offers. he aaya, an �escape· from ·ruts of language and 
thought• into which medical ethics has fallen. 
Ruddick aee11& to be right that in contemporary medical 
ethics the emphasis been on the virtues of physicians and the 
rt�hta of patients; there baa been an unhealthy neglect of 
ayatewittc treat11ent of the virtues of a good patient. 1 
Before scrutinizing Ruddick'• analogies, it .ay be worth­
vhile to set out for comparison one of the ·rutted· approaches . 
a n  approach that aimply aaatgna duttea to doctors and pattent a .  
Although .oat of the virtues of a person i n  general w i l l  alao 
be virtues of a person aa patient, there is a hierarchy of 
virtues that seems to follow fro� the vexy concept of a 
patient. or froa vhat being a patient adda to the concept of 
being a peraon. Furthermo re, even vhen the aame word ia uaed, 
the virtues of a person in general are somewhat different when 
the person is a patient. The essential hierarchy of virtues 
that follow from the conoept of a patient may be outlined 
briefly. 
Sin� patients are people. a good patient ta a person 
acting well within regard to injury or diaeaae. 
How ought one act vith regard to injury or diaeaae? Since 
injuries and diaeaaea often have harmful conaequencea, one acts 
well in this regard if one acts so as to minimize the harmful 
consequences. But injuries and dtaeaae can often have aome 
beneficial consequences, ao a good patient ta a person who acts 
ao aa to maximize the good conaequencea of injury and disease. 
Although there are important conceptual dif ferencea between 
injury and disease, what they have i n  cOll.on i1a that they are, 
or produce or might produce . a physical disability. A. physical 
disability is an inability to act as one w i l l a .  For various 
reaaona, historical 1 scientific and cultural, a·o1De epiaodea are 
claaaif ied aa diaeaae o r  injury even though they are not and do 
not have the potential to become disabilities. Aa long as a 
person is not disabled and ta not threatened with dtaabtltty 
there ia no need for medical concern. 
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A person who cannot walk but ha.a no desire or need to walk 
ia no .:>re disabled than a person who cannot fly but has no 
need or deatre to fly or a peraon who cannot read m1nda but haa 
no need or desire to read m i nd s .  Admittedly, there ia a degree 
of stipulation in this account of disability. But if dia­
a bility ta not defined as "the absence of needed abi l i t i ea , ­
then the account of what i t  ia to be a good patient v i l l  be 
both .:>re ,ca.plex and .:>re s pe culative . 2  
The f i r s t  virtue o f  a patient , therefore, ta sel f-know­
ledge . A person c.annot know hov to act aa a patient unless he 
or ahe knows that there ia aoeething he or ahe needs or vanta 
to do but 1c.annot do for aome phyatcal reason. 
What, in general , a peraon needs or vhat it ta good to 
deaire ar,e queattona for econoa1ca and 1teneral ethics, res­
pectively, and go beyond the scope of these comment s .  
But the virtue of self-knowledge aa applied to patients 
should not be confused vith the virtue of self-knowledge in 
general. There are t1any aspects of one's aelf of which it ia 
not vrong to re�tn ignorant. Whatever the general virtue of 
self-knowledge a'90unta t o ,  there ta nothing vrong vith forget­
ting the trivial details of what waa done last week or being 
ignorant of vhether with trainin� and practice one has the 
ability to pass the CPA examination or to climb M t .  Eve r e s t .  
There i a  something vrong w i t h  ignoring physical disabilities 
that interfere with what one otherwise wants to do. The kind 
of aelf-knowledge demanded of patients ta only vague ly related 
to the kind of eelf-knowledge required by Socrates. 
Aaauftdng that one has legit1"8te needs or desires that one 
cannot f u l fill for so11e physical reason, the appropriate 
reaponse t a ,  of course, to seek help. 
The physician, one who is expert i n  physi c ,  is a person who 
1 1  concerned about and has knowledge regarding physical dis­
a b i l i t y .  Once a person has determined that he or ehe has a 
physical dtaabi l i t y ,  the next step ts to eeek help. Phyatctana 
or doctors are those vho provide such help. If the f irat 
virtue of a patient 11 aelf-knowled�e, the knowledge t h a t  one 
ta disabled, the second virtue is willtn�nees to seek and 
accept help. The phyaician or doctor is one whose job i t  is t o  
provide help for t h e  diaabled; so the f t r a t  virtue of a physi­
cian ta to be a helper, to know hov and vhen to help. 
There are .. ny waya to help the disabled. So aany akilla 
are involved in the general area of medicine that no one person 
can be expected to have e>re than a few of these s k i l l s .  To 
avoid the te111inological confuaion that reaulte from referring 
to doctors, phyatctana, nure e s ,  mRdical techntctane , atdea, 
consul t a n t s ,  and ao forth, it ta convenient, in philoaophical 
discourse, to have a generic term for all those vho help the 
diaabled. Fortunately, auch a generic term already exiata. A 
.edtc ta one who .. kea it hie or her buatneea to help the 
di aabled directly. A good medic ia a peraon vho knowa hov and 
when to help the diaabled (directly) and who apecialtzea in 
providinR such help. 
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A s  is usuallly the case with personal deficiencies and 
forms of h e l p ,  there is need for a broker, an intermediary, an 
agent or a ma t ch�ker whose job it is to match desires and 
needs w i t h  the supply of servi ces. There t s  n o  reason tn the 
nature of things why the patient and the medic cannot determine 
the appropriate match privately through a negotiation proces s .  
But since there i s  always t he  poasiblity that ignorance, greed, 
self-deception , conflict of interests, distraction or some 
other obstacle will inh i b i t  such a pairing of medic and 
pa t i e n t ,  a third party can often be of service. Such a third 
party i s  not s t r i c l y  necessary and aiay onlv make ma t t ers worse. 
lf a ...edic and a patient cannot find each other or cannot agree 
t o  co-operate then they need a third party; b u t  both have to 
a�ree on the s k i l l  and trustworthiness o f  the third party. I f  
an infinite regress i s  t o  be avoided, a t  some point me d i c  and 
patient w i l l  have to agree on a mediator between them, or a 
mediator between their respective mediators. To raise the dis­
cussion to a philosophical leve l ,  reference 111ay be CDade to a 
medical administrator. Depending on the circu"'8tances , this 
administrator may be a stn�le person, a group, a n  interlocking 
chain, an i ns t i t u t i o n ,  or even merely hypothe t i c a l .  Another 
v i r t ue  of both medic and patient , is obedience to the authority 
of an administrator or referee. 
That i t  is a virtue to obey a "medical administrator" may 
seem to be a bizarre claim. What reason could there be to 
elevate a medical administrator to this s t a t u s ?  The argument 
is that certainly a patient as a disabled person in need of 
help should surrender son1e autonoaiy. There is no reason t o  
a s s u 1r1e  that t h e  me d i c  m u s t  be obeyed; medics are not author­
i t i e s  in the political sense. So, i t  is argued, obedience is 
owed to that person or process that it rightly assuf'led to match 
patient and medic correctly. What is called an �administrator" 
here may actually be an admini s t r a to r ,  but i t  could just as 
well be someone from another profession or j u s t  an administra­
tive process between medic and p a t i e n t .  The essential point is 
that the patient does ove obedience to someone, but medical 
q ua l i f i a t i o ns  alone are insufficient in determining who should 
be obeyed . Kence, a non-medical (administrative) process 
should be used . A good patient does not treat h i ms e l f  nor does 
he manage his OWTI treatment, but neither does a good patient 
simply obey any medic who happens along. A �ood patient obeys 
the medic assigned by an appropriate administrative proce s s .  
When there i s  COU>plete t r u s t  and confidence between medic 
and patient, the �die and the patient can cooperatively manage 
their relat ionship and eliminate the middle ma n .  But if the 
character or knowledge of either is i n sufficient, they need to 
f i nd some third person to serve as a referee. Both t h e  patient 
and the medic must obey the referee if the treatment is to be 
successful. Whatever the • i JOl i ficance of the e�pression 
• d o c t o r ' s  orders� and apart from dramatic refusals to accept 
t r e a t me n t ,  the basic point is that obedience to the medic is no 
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virtue in i tself.  The virtue 1e to obey whoever knowe be a t .  
t t  i a  juet ae �uch a vice for patiente to di9regard o r  inter­
fere vith l,e�iti.ate medical help u it fa for them to credu­
l oue l y  accept vhatever ia offered under the guiee of 111e d k i n e .  
To au-ri z e ,  t he  vi rtuee of a patient are aelf-knovled�e, 
a villi ngneaa to eeek aod accept help, and obedience to vhoever 
�nove beat regardiGg the help needed. The virtue• of a medic 
are knowing hov ar� vhen to h e l p  the di gabled aod obedience to 
whoever kJiOWB beat, t he  referee. 
In hie pape r ,  ·Patient �oral i t y :  Compliance, Perseverance 
and Other Athletic Virtue e . ·  William Ruddick contributee to the 
diecovery a1� elaboration of the virtuee of a good patient . The 
.ain e t rategy of •patient Moral ity• i i  to introduce and evalu­
ate certain analogies between the medic/patient relationehip 
and other hu .. n relationahipa. Theee analogiee are the central 
concern of the paper ,  �ut .,re often than not the patient aeems 
to get loet i n  the proceaa. Wh a t ,  epecifically, do analogiee 
w i t h  bu1ine 9 1 ,  vith a JPO t t ,  with family life or with war t e l l  ue 
a b ou t  medicine? 
Analogiee ca.e in .. ny f on1e and are uaed for many pur­
po1e1: to illuetrate, to pereuade, to explain and to diecover. 
No reaaon ie given in the paper vhy the analogiee 11ugge11ted 
ahould help to il luminate the medic/patient relationehip. Why, 
for exa•p l e ,  ehouldn •t the medic/patient relation be ueed to 
i l lu�tnate othe relations, rather than vice veraa? 3 Analogiee 
can be di11cu1111ed and elaborated with aome profit even if for no 
particular purpoee. It ie 1mpoaaible, however, to evaluate an 
analogy vit�IOut detet"Tl\ining what the analogy ia for a nd  what i t  
la intended to ehow, Since an analogy ia a compa rieon of two 
unlike thinge there w i l l  alwaye be an enormoue number of 
d i f  ferencee (diaanalogi e a ) .  But vhich of theee differencee 
.. le.ea a d i f ference in rejecting the analogy ae a poor one? 
Until we know the purpoee of the analogy, there ie no way to 
aay. 
Why, one might aek, i9 the analogy of friend/friend aimply 
ignored, even though it ia the moat ancient and, 1101111e would 
c l aim, the moat appropriate 110del for the medic/patient rela­
tionship. 4 
The military analogy ia only eketched and ite terme are not 
clear. A military analogy that would eeem leaet open to die­
analogy i a  
•die patient death 
eoldi�r: Nttlef ield enemy 
but the analogy Ruddick aeema to have i n  mind i s  
medic 2atient death 
officer eoldiere enemy 
Furthe�re, the paper uncritically a88Uml!8 that dieeaae 
and injury c a n  be grouped together with death aa i f  there were 
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no important differences. The aedic, i t  eeeaa&, leads or assists 
the patient in fighting death, disease or injury. le thie an 
analogy vorth pursuing? Some vou l d  argue that the role of the 
medic ia to help the patient not fiJht but live vith disability 
and ainimite ita harm. 
Putting aside QlMtst ions about the exact nature of the 
enemy ,  there eeeaa& no escaping the almost literal truth that in 
much of aedicine the patient •s body ia a battlefield. To carry 
this analogy no further, howeve r ,  leaves the patient vith a 
vholly passive role. The patient 's body is a battlefield; 
i . e . ,  a var is being fought in his hoaeland, but the patient 
(as pe t"B o n ,  not just body) is to some extent a participant i n  
the struggle. In these terms, the physician need not be 86 
Ruddick aeeas to aaauae, an officer. The aedic might better be 
conceived as an a l l y .  Specifically, a foreign ally vhose ovn 
homeland is not nov the scene of battle. This military analogy 
ia free of a l l  the cri t icisms Ruddick has of the mi l i tary 
analogy. 
The analogy vith a coach is more difficult to evaluate 
because there are no general rules for coaching. Certainly a 
major disanalogy ia that a coach cannot touch his athlete 
during the contest (in most sports). but orthodox veatern 
medicine haa been strongly interventionist. ln spite of a l l  
t h a t  Ruddick says i n  i t a  favor, the analogy between a physician 
aod a coach ia open to at least as great an objection as 
Ruddick is able to raise against the analogies that he rej e c t s .  
The consumer and client mo de l s ,  Ruddick says, ask too aruch of 
the patient , vhile the child and soldier UK>dels ask too much of 
the physician. Does the coach model really fare any better 
than those based on clients and soldiers? After a l l ,  there are 
t i UJie s ,  and not just a few, vhen the patient has to play an 
almost vholly passive role relative to the medic. Certainly 
this is true vhen the patient is uncons cious, but it is also 
true for a host of oiedical procedures performed on conscious 
patients. The coach, on the other hand, no matter hov active 
he vants to be ,  has to vork through the abilities, attitudes 
and understanding of his athletes. Furthermore , in any organ­
ized sport the coach is necessarily in the role of an author­
i t y ,  even if a less coercive one than that of a military 
commande r. The medic, by contrast, has, or should have , 
authority n o t  because of hie position or role, but simply 
because of technical co.petence. To vhat degree the aedic 
shculd take charge depends, or should depend, on vho is beet 
eble to do vhat needs to be done. There is nothing like this 
kind of relationship i n  athletics. The coach is not free to do 
for the leas skilled or ambitious athletes vhat others do for 
themeelvea. The coach gets them all into a condition vhere 
they can play for thrmselvea--or does not l e t  the• play. 
The relatiouahip just described aeema very •uch like that 
of •ilitary allies, especially vhen the resources available to 
each differ greatly. Some allies, those vith fev resources may 
have to play a largely passive or subservient role. Row trUch 
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each ally should do depends •uch more on what they are actually 
able to do than vhat ta spelled out tn a treaty. Given a 
c�n goal, there ta l i t t l e  choice but for those who are beat 
able to do ao.ethtng to take charge . Who takes charge of what 
v t l l  depend on the circu .. tancea of each. That ta not saying 
very •uch, but i t  .ay be about a l l  ve can aay in general about 
the relative reaP<>n.tbltttee of a l l y  and a l l y  or doctor and 
patient . 
The virtues of a person and of a patient are aomettaea used 
for determining vho should get help. It ta one thing to claim 
that patients have certain re.spo ns t b t l tttea; it ta another to 
say that medical care vtll be provided only if those responai­
btltttea are discharged aattaf actorily. 
What Ruddick cAlla (vithout eodorain,t) the �moral means� 
t ea t  for treatment or public funds, ta open to a fundamental 
phtloeophtcal objection. It ta hard to see hov someone can be 
at fault in brt�tng on a condition that requires me d i ca l  
attention. The vay pe o p l e  l i v e  c e r t a i n l y  a f f e c t s  t h e i r  health, 
but part of the medtc'a job ia to help people to overcome the 
ignorance and fooltahnesa of unhealthy habi t s .  To deny health 
care on the grounds that the illness or injury vaa in effect 
aelf-tnf l i cted ta to assume that in a cool hour people decided 
to harm themselves. Even when this certainly ts the case, the 
usual tnferenc.e would be that the patient needs paych i a t r 1 c  
attention aa v e l l .  The only clear case of a justified dental 
of medical treatment on moral grounds vould seem to be when, 
contrary to the patient ' s  claims, treatment 1a not medically 
indicated. Apart fra..i taauea o f  diatrtbuttve justice, it 
aee�a vrong to seek unneeded medical care even thou�h it ta 
not neceaaartly vrong to seek and accept other unneeded 
personal services. Yor reasons that are not altogether clear, 
people vho go to the barber evexy veek because they enjoy 
the barber's company even though they do not need a haircut 
that often have not acted badly. But those vho seek and 
accept medical treatment that they do not need have acted 
badly. 
The other tDOral grounds for denying medical treatment 
assume a acarc1ty of medical resources. Under conditions of 
acarctty, aomeone w i l l  be dented needed teatl'llltnt, the only 
queatton ta who. Given that there ta a shortage there ts 
reaaon to deny treat-aent to those who because of their own lack 
of cooperation are unlikely to benefit from the treatment. But 
this ia essentially a kind of triage and only incidentally 
iDVolvea a 1110ral judgment . 
It ta also poa.stble that 1 n times of acarctty some people 
w i l l  be dented treatment on the grounds that they do not me r i t  
such c a r e .  Is there really n o  relevant d i fference between, 
aey, a vtc:tt11 o f  a k.ntfe attack and h i s  aeaatlant? :Suppose 
they both need f ?DRdtate treatment and that a choice must be 
.. d e .  Surely those vho are at fault cannot be alloved to 
preempt treatment for their v i c tims. To accept thta t y pe  of 
dtecri111nat1on under conditions of scarcity ta not at .a l l  to 
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elldorse withholding medical t�eataent as a aeans of �eforming 
another person's life or as a way of punis hing them for bad 
behavior. 5 
Roth the athletic aod the var analogies are especially 
appropriate when a p p l i ed  to the dying patient. Unlike disease 
and injury that can be avoided or cured. death 18 inevitable. 
oeath can be acoepted or delayed. but it cnnot be fought w i t h .  
Any injury o r  disease should be avoided o r  treated ( i f  Pos­
st b l e )  but only a pre!Mture death t s  to be conte8ted. Here 
sports are a real help. Once it t s  certain t h a t  an athletic 
contest will be lost what is important i8 -endi� v e 1 1 · ;  
finishing t h e  conte8t in a 8portsmanl1ke vay and avotdtn� 
e�haustion or injury that tdght jeopardize a future perf or­
mance . So too with var. Once defeat ta certain. the virtues 
of a 8oldier change !because the �oal is now a negotiated 
surrender rather than victory. The advocates of hospice care 
for the dying are in accord w i t h  these analogies. but so are 
those who submit to non-therapeutic treataent in the interests 
of re8earch that iaay be n e f i t  others. 
Analogies are not nece88arily intel lectual Dlaythings. 
When °'o cases of ethical concern are shown to be similar in 
some ways, the burden is on those who would judge them differ­
ently to Point to some relevant dtf ference. For this reason. 
Ruddick is perhaps overly aodest about the i•port of his 
argu01?nt. If, on the other hand, there are enough relevant 
dtf ferences between the coach/athlete relation8h1p and the 
doctor/patient relationship, then the analogy has no persuasive 
force and is at be s t  19erely sugge s t i v e .  
NOTES 
1 .  Geor�e Henrik von Wright mention& the obligations of a 
patient as one who ts a burden to others (in needing help, 
being a source of contagion and harming others when de­
ranged ) ,  The Varietes of Goodness (London : Routledge Kegan 
Paul, 196 3 ) ,  pp. 59-60. H .  Oliver Kepler states that • t t  
cannot be overemphasized that evety patient and evety 
c i t i z e n  has a prime responsibility in the health-care 
business that has been poorly me t , •  Medical Stewardship; 
Fulfil ling !.!!!!. Hippocratic Legacy (Westport : Greenwood 
Press, 196 1) ,  p .  1 27. Kepler cites "'The Re&ponB ibUty of 
the Indtvid�al'" by John Knowles in John Know les, ed . ,  Doing 
»etter and Feeling Worse (Nev York: Norton, 1977),  PP • 57-
8 0 .  
2 .  Von Wright discusses what counts a s  aedtcal goodness for 
those vho do not have norul wants and ne·eds in Varieties 
of Goodness , pp. 58-59. 
3 .  Indeed, "the conception of the good of man on the ba8i8 of 
aedtcal analogies i 8  characteristic of the ethics and 
8
Philosophic Exchange, Vol. 14 [1983], No. 1, Art. 8
http://digitalcommons.brockport.edu/phil_ex/vol14/iss1/8
1 0 6  DAVID ! .  VllIT! 
political philoephy of Plato. 
t h i nk, beaic:ally soun d.• 
Goodne11..,1.. p. 6 1 .  
The idea is profound and. I 
Von Wright. Varieti�a of 
4 .  The 110at acceaaible source favoring friendahip as the basic 
eodel of the doctor/patient relat ionahip ia P .  Lain 
Entralgo, Doctor and Patient (Netit York: KcGrav-R i l l ,  1969).  
S. Jonathan Glover ad•ita that i t  i a  •intuitively prepoater­
oua· never to diacriminate betveen cri•inals and their 
victt .. , but he goes on to obeerve that •this ta by no 
.eall8 the ae.e aa allovtng general character evalWitiona by 
doctora treating natural diaorders , v  ea�eing Death � 
.Saving Live• (Karwondsworth: Penguin, 1 9 7 7 ) ,  p. 226.  
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